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Abstract 
Recently it has been shown that the allocation of attention by a participant in a visual search 
task can be affected by memory items that have to be maintained by a co-actor, when similar 
tasks are jointly engaged by dyads (He, Lever, & Humphreys, 2011). In the present study we 
examined the contribution of individualism-collectivism to this ‘interpersonal memory 
guidance’ effect. Actors performed visual search while a preview image was either held by 
the critical participant, held by a co-actor or was irrelevant to either participant. Attention 
during search was attracted to stimuli that matched the contents of the co-actor’s memory. 
This interpersonal effect correlated with the collectivism scores, and was enhanced by 
priming with a collectivistic scenario. The dimensions of individualism, however, did not 
contribute to performance. These data suggest that collectivism, but not individualism, 
modulates interpersonal influences on memory and attention in joint action. 
 
Keywords 
Interpersonal processes; Individualism-collectivism; Working memory; Attention; Priming 
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Introduction 
 You are a big fan of whiskies and recently interested in some books about whiskies. You 
searched online and kept a note of several titles before heading for a bookstore. At the door of 
the bookstore you met a friend, who talked to you briefly about his recent passion for interior 
design and showed you some books he just bought. In the bookstore, while you were 
searching for the food-and-drink section suddenly your attention was captured by some books 
about interior design, even though you did not care about it at all. In this kind of scenarios 
information relevant to others is also influencing us even it is not helping us in any way. The 
question is: why and how does this happen? In the current research, we studied one 
interpersonal cognitive process, namely the interpersonal memory guidance effect of attention 
(i.e., the influence on one person’s visual attention from the knowledge about another 
co-acting person’s memory representation; He, Lever, & Humphreys, 2011), and investigated 
the relationship between this effect and the collectivistic and individualistic traits of the 
co-acting individuals. 
 
Interpersonal cognitive processes 
 We very often engage with others in actions as human beings are social animals and 
constantly influenced by social contexts. In the most basic form, the mere presence of others 
influences individual performance. As a result, simple actions are facilitated whereas 
complex actions are impaired (Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Zajonc, 1965). Apart from the 
general effect from another individual’s presence, aspects of one’s performance can also be 
affected by tasks carried out by others. For instance, when one is observing another person 
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performing a certain action, one has the tendency to perform this action (Prinz, 1997; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). In more complex situations, two or more persons can be 
involved in the same set of tasks. In these interaction situations, social cognition is 
fundamentally different from that when only presence or observation is involved (De Jaegher, 
Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010; Schilbach et al., 2013). Possible scenarios include following 
another person’s attention to objects and events (Eilan, Hoerl, McCormack, & Roessler, 2005; 
Mundy & Newell, 2007), mutually sharing attention to physical objects with a co-actor 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2012), encoding information to and recalling from memory together (Wegner, 
1986), and adjusting actions to co-workers’ actions to achieve a common goal (Knoblich & 
Sebanz, 2006; Richardson, Marsh, & Baron, 2007). 
 In investigations of the cognitive consequences of tasks being performed by two actors, 
Sebanz and colleagues (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003, 2005) demonstrated that action 
planning is affected by a co-actor’s action alternative even when the participants are asked to 
perform independent tasks. Previously, Simon (1969) found that when participants are 
making two-choice responses to visual stimuli with two hands, reaction times (RTs) are 
longer when the stimulus’s spatial information is not compatible with the responding hand 
(e.g., responding to a stimulus on the left with the right hand) than when they are spatially 
compatible (e.g., responding to a stimulus on the right with the right hand), an effect called 
spatial compatibility effect. Sebanz et al. extended the finding by showing that this effect is 
observed when people perform alone a two-choice RT task, where both response alternatives 
are at their disposal (e.g., responding with right hand to red and with left hand to green), and 
when they perform a go/nogo task with another person, where only one response alternative 
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is at their disposal (e.g., responding to red while another participant is responding to green). 
Performing a go/nogo version of the task alone (e.g., responding to red but not to green when 
there is no co-actor present), however, eliminates this effect. These data suggest that shared 
aspects of the task context (e.g., the spatial locations of stimuli and responses) are represented 
when participants engage in joint action. 
 Several studies suggest that acting together also modulates attention in action. Inhibition 
of return (IOR) is an effect showing slowed responses for previously attended locations, and 
represents a bias discouraging attention from going back to previously attended locations 
(Klein, 2000). Welsh and colleagues (Welsh et al., 2005, 2007) studied this IOR effect 
between persons by asking two participants (sitting opposite each other) to complete a series 
of rapid reaching movements to target stimuli. They found that IOR occurs not only within, 
but also across people: movements to a target that appeared at the same location as a 
previously presented target were slower than responses to a target that appeared at a new 
location, when one participant responded to the first and the other to the second stimulus. In 
this case participants were affected by the context of where stimuli fell on their partner’s 
response trial, when the participants engaged in the same task but across different trials. 
There can also be negative priming across two people each taking turn to act (Frischen, 
Loach, & Tipper, 2009). For example, when one of two participants has to ignore a distractor 
located close to his/her hand, the other participant can show delays in responding to stimuli 
presented at this location on the subsequent trial. These findings suggest that interacting with 
a co-actor’s action can trigger similar processes of inhibitory attention as performing the 
action oneself. 
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 Joint performance also relies on shared experiences between the co-acting persons. For 
example, in Richardson et al.’s study (2012), people showed a gazing preference and memory 
advantage for negative images in comparison to positive images only when they believed that 
other people were performing the same task with the same stimulus set. A similar joint action 
enhancement was found for effects of mood on attitude formation. Participants’ attitude 
towards the stimuli was more influenced by the mood when a co-actor was sharing the same 
experience compared with the condition when the experience was not shared by a co-actor, 
and was most affected when the task sharing was among people using similar avatars 
(Shteynberg et al., 2013). Another study echoed these findings by showing that people are 
more successful in pursuing a goal if this goal is shared with others, especially when these 
others are similar to themselves (Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011). The importance of 
experience sharing, interestingly, is not restricted to similarity of the tasks, but also extends to 
the simultaneity of task execution, which also benefits the joint task performance (Shteynberg 
& Apfelbaum, 2013). 
 
Interpersonal memory guidance 
 It has been documented that when a participant performs a search task alone, attention is 
drawn to stimuli that match information held in the participant’s working memory (WM; 
Chelazzi, Miller, Duncan, & Desimone, 1993). For instance, when participants are searching 
for a target in the search display while holding a picture in the WM, RTs are shorter if the 
target is by the side of the memorised picture (the picture provides valid information about 
the target’s location) than if the target is far away from that picture (the spatial information is 
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invalid) (Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005). In addition to RTs, this WM guidance 
process also affects the first eye movements made in search, modulates the perceptual 
discriminability of the target, and can even operate in an involuntary fashion, when stimuli in 
WM are irrelevant to the task (Downing, 2000; Soto et al., 2005; Soto, Wriglesworth, 
Bahrami-Balani, & Humphreys, 2010). 
 Recently, we studied this coupling between WM and attention in a joint action setup, and 
showed that shared task representations can affect attention through each actor coding in 
memory information relevant to only one of the participants (He et al., 2011). Participants 
were tested in pairs performing a speeded visual search task, in which RTs were recorded, 
while one participant held an image in WM. The research replicated the standard 
(intrapersonal) WM-based attentional guidance effect on RTs, showing shorter RTs to targets 
next to the images the participant had to memorise than to targets falling at locations different 
from the memorised images. More interestingly, it was found that this effect takes place 
interpersonally as well – that is, when a participant was aware that the co-actor was 
memorising a certain image, the participant responded faster to targets flanking this image 
compared with conditions in which targets were flanking another irrelevant image. This 
suggests that participants form a co-representation of WM items relevant to their co-actor and 
use this representation to guide their own attention. 
 Other evidence indicates that joint action effects are modulated by social factors. For 
instance, effects of co-representation in joint action tasks are observed when participants are 
interacting with a person, but not with a non-human agent (Tsai & Brass, 2007). Furthermore, 
the joint action effect is present for single participants who believe they are interacting with 
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others (Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008). Looking into 
the effect of group membership on social interactions, Shteynberg and colleagues went 
further to show that social learning, goal pursuit, infusion between mood and attitude, and 
prominence judgement of stimuli are all enhanced when joint action is performed by similar, 
compared with dissimilar, actors (Shteynberg, 2010; Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013; 
Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011; Shteynberg et al., 2013). Also addressing the group 
membership issue, our previous studies showed a more complicated pattern. He et al. (2011) 
tested three groups of participants: Caucasian strangers, Caucasian friends, and Chinese 
living in Britain. The participants from the latter two groups were considered social ingroup 
members based on mutual friendship (Caucasian friends) or common cultural and language 
background (Chinese living in Britain). Neither set of ingroup members, when acting together, 
showed an interpersonal WM guidance effect, in contrast to when the tasks were performed 
by outgroup participants (Caucasian strangers). This suggests that the interpersonal WM 
guidance effect is reduced for social ingroup members. Another study (He, Sebanz, & 
Humphreys, in preparation) however found evidence that shared racial group membership has 
a different influence on the interpersonal WM guidance effect, by showing that this effect 
occurs between pairs of British Caucasians, and between pairs of South Asians, but not 
between Caucasian-and-South-Asian participant pairs. To account for their results, He et al. 
suggested that members of a close ingroup (Caucasian friends, Chinese in the UK) have high 
inter-personal trust and so do not take their co-actor’s task so strongly into account. Paired 
actors from a less closely, but more fundamentally, knitted group (white British and South 
Asian stranger pairs) affiliate more to each other and therefore pay more attention to their 
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co-actor’s action. As a consequence, interpersonal memory effects result. 
 The findings from the above discussed studies provided a showcase of social influences 
on joint action effects, and raised the possibility that the degree to which participants are 
affected by their co-actors may be modulated by other social factors too. In particular, 
participants who are oriented towards collective action may pay attention to their co-actor 
relatively more than participants who are more individualistic and so not attend to the other 
person’s task. 
 
Collectivism and individualism 
 Individualism-collectivism (IND-COL) scales are measures or constructs of social 
patterns reflecting the degree to which participants view themselves as members of a social 
group or as an individual. Individuals scoring high in collectivism are thought to take on 
group values and norms. In contrast, individualistic individuals view themselves as loosely 
connected to other people and choose to operate autonomously. For individualistic people, 
personal goals usually receive a higher priority than any collective goal (Hofstede, 1980; 
Schwartz, 1990; Triandis, 1995). 
 The IND-COL distinction was initially proposed as a single dimension at the cultural 
level, with individualism and collectivism being the two extremes of a bipolar continuum. As 
a collective entity, a culture has an established IND-COL trait; and any culture can be mapped 
somewhere along this continuum (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Hui, 1988). Linked to the IND-COL 
distinction is the notion of whether people perceive themselves as independent or 
interdependent in relation to other people. In an individualistic culture the self is independent 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
10 
 
while it is interdependent in collectivistic cultures (Hofstede, 1984; for reviews, see Kitayama, 
Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
 In contrast to this initial view of single continuum, subsequent evidence however 
suggests that individualism and collectivism are separate constructs (Brewer & Chen, 2007; 
Lehman, 2004; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Schwartz, 1994; see also Oyserman 
& Lee, 2007). This is especially true for individuals from a single culture (Triandis, 2001; 
Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), as individual differences are also evident within any particular 
culture. With a higher probability adhering to the culture’s construct, varied tendencies are 
observed among individuals (for reviews, see Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). 
 In addition, Triandis and colleagues proposed the dimension of horizontal/vertical which 
is orthogonal to IND-COL (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995). 
The horizontal dimension refers to whether the individual is similar to others on attributes 
and status; groups can be considered horizontal when people are equal to each other and there 
is high group cohesion. In contrast, the vertical dimension reflects the degree to which people 
accept inequality/hierarchy within a group. Then it follows that the IND-COL dimension can 
be expanded to cover four measures: horizontal collectivism (HC), vertical collectivism (VC), 
horizontal individualism (HI), and vertical individualism (VI). As Triandis (1995, 2001) 
concluded, horizontal collectivistic people are cooperative, and merge themselves with other 
members in the group as equal entities; vertical collectivistic individuals readily accept 
hierarchy, and are willing to follow authorities and sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the 
whole group. In contrast to this, horizontal individualistic people are more independent and 
believe that all individuals are more or less comparable in their power and status. VI 
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individuals, on the other hand, emphasise on competition and achievement, and accept 
inequality between individuals (Triandis, 1995, 2001). 
 The HC and VC dimensions have clear similarities, with HC weighing the relationship 
between individuals and VC reflecting the relationship between individuals and the collective 
(Brewer & Chen, 2007; Chen, Meindl, & Hunt, 1997). This is confirmed by Triandis and 
colleagues (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) who showed that HC and VC scores 
for individuals are highly correlated. Hence they were often combined to form a single 
collectivism measure (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2002). In contrast, HI and VI were designed as 
distinct measures (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995), with the VI having a critical and 
exclusive orientation towards competition and winning, which conception is related to power 
distance (Hofstede, 1980) and personal power/achievement (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). 
Consistent with this, prior studies have shown that HI and VI scores either do not correlate 
significantly or they may even correlate negatively (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995; 
Triandis & Gelfang, 1998). Because the VI dimension of Triandis’s IND-COL scale is 
atypical among various IND-COL scales, Oyserman and colleagues dropped this VI 
dimension when comparing various IND-COL scales (Oyserman et al., 2002). Nevertheless, 
the VI dimension reveals another important aspect of individualism, and should be taken into 
account in studies looking at individual-group relationship. 
 In the current study, we aimed at investigating the contribution of IND-COL to the 
interpersonal memory guidance effect with the help of Triandis’s IND-COL scale (Triandis, 
1995). Because HC and VC dimensions are similar, we would combine them as a single 
collectivism scale if they are significantly correlated. In contrast, HI and VI would be treated 
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as distinct measures following suggestions from previous research. 
 
Dynamic IND-COL 
 An individual’s scores on these dimensions are not necessarily static, but are dynamic. 
Every individual has collectivistic and individualistic components of self construal and, 
usually, cultural values are sampled as the default themes, and this sampling can be 
reinforced by just exposing individuals to the IND-COL questionnaire thus making them 
aware of their own self construal (Oyserman, Sakamoto, & Lauffer, 1998). Furthermore, the 
environment can modulate the weighting given to the individualistic-collectivistic 
components. For example, team-work situations are likely to remind individuals of their 
interdependencies, making the collectivistic components more dominant. Accordingly, 
individualism or collectivism can be selectively primed by introducing individuals to 
individualistic or collectivistic scenarios (Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 
2008; Triandis, 1995). For instance, by asking participants to describe the ways in which they 
are different from or similar to their families or friends, individualism and collectivism may 
be respectively primed. Similar effects can be found by introducing participants to stories 
emphasising the abilities of individuals or background of a family (Trafimow, Triandis, & 
Goto, 1991; see also Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). 
 These priming methods generally manipulate collectivism as a whole, and the horizontal 
dimension of individualism (HI is similar to other individualism measures, yet VI is not 
typically addressed by individualism scales). The VI dimension, as an exclusive measure of 
competition and winning (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995), may not be affected though. 
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Unfortunately, few studies directly manipulated this dimension. Following the definition of 
VI, we suggest that manipulating competition or competitiveness (e.g., Malhotra, 2010; Ruys 
& Aarts, 2010) will have an effect on how much the VI dimension is weighed in the sampling 
of self construal. Other researchers reasoned that VI also reflects the tendencies of 
interpreting power in personalised terms, and suggested that VI could be better understood to 
incorporate this personalised power status (Shavitt, Torelli, & Riemer, 2011). If this is the 
case, then VI can be manipulated by priming the power concept or powerfulness (Briñol et al., 
2007; Rucker & Galinsky, 2009). 
 
The current study 
 The contrasts in interpersonal attitudes and interactions between collectivistic and 
individualistic people are known to affect cognitive processes such as attention and 
perception. For instance, in a cross-cultural comparison, Masuda and Nisbett (2001) showed 
that people in a more collectivistic culture (Japanese) attended more to the view of a scene as 
a whole, whereas people from an individualistic culture (American) attended more to local 
details (see also Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). 
Similar findings have been obtained when participants were asked to replicate line drawings, 
with Japanese participants (from a collectivistic culture) more strongly influenced by the 
global context than Western individuals (from a more individualistic culture) (Kitayama, 
Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). In general, collectivistic cultures produce more holistic 
and relational perception, whereas individualistic cultures encourage a more analytic view of 
the environment (see Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng, 2007). Testing IND-COL effects in the 
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same group of participants (within-group effects) also found a similar pattern – priming 
collectivism accelerates detection of global letters made up of smaller parts, and facilitates 
recognition of embedded figures, whereas priming individualism produced the opposite 
pattern (Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002; Lin & Han, 2008; see also Lin, Lin, & Han, 2008). 
Similarly, response delays to one feature with the presence of another incongruent feature 
(Stroop effect; Stroop, 1935) were reduced when individualism was primed in contrast to the 
collectivism priming condition where combined perception of features is reinforced 
(Oyserman & Lee, 2008). 
 Research in relation to the distinct VI dimension also suggested VI’s effects on cognition, 
though of a more complicated pattern. Some studies have shown that co-representation of 
other’s tasks does not take place in a competitive relationship (Hommel, Colzato, & van den 
Wildenberg, 2009; Iani et al., 2011, Experiment 2), and that higher personalised power 
promotes focusing on views from people’s own mindset and reducing processing of other 
information (Briñol et al., 2007). Another study, however, demonstrated that competition 
enhances shared task representation in comparison to an independent condition (Ruys & 
Aarts, 2010). These works clearly showed us the influence of individualism and collectivism 
on cognition. Although the IND-COL discrepancy is generally based on cultural differences, 
and VI-oriented studies showed conflicting results, they nevertheless led us to speculate the 
possible interaction between these dimensions and interpersonal processes. 
 The current study aimed at further understanding the social nature of the interpersonal 
memory guidance effect. Different from our previous study (which discussed group 
membership), we took a different perspective by assessing the contribution of IND-COL. 
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Instead of relying on cultural differences, we measured and manipulated IND-COL at the 
individual level within a single culture to increase power and reduce confounds. As discussed 
above, HC and VC are very similar and highly correlated. Moreover, the inter-individual 
relationship (HC) and individual-and-collective relationship (VC) are hard, if not impossible, 
to be teased apart in person-to-person joint action scenarios. Therefore, HC and VC were 
combined as a single collectivism measure in the current study. At the same time, HI and VI 
were analysed separately as distinct measures. 
 Participants were tested in pairs, and were asked to carry out both a memory and a visual 
search tasks, with a memory cue appearing initially prior to a search display. The initial cue 
would re-appear in the visual search display, aligned either with the search target or a 
distractor (on valid and invalid trials respectively). There were three memory conditions 
determined by the category of the initial cue. If the cue was from one designated category, the 
participants carrying out the search task had to remember it (the own memory condition); if it 
was from a second category then the co-actor had to memorise (the other’s memory 
condition); if the initial cue was from a third category, then neither participant had to 
memorise it (the baseline condition, testing for effects of mere presentation of the cue). We 
asked whether visual attention, which is measured by RTs in the search task, was affected by 
the initial cue (indexed by the effects of cue validity on search), whether this varied according 
to whether it was a cue from the own memory, other’s memory, or baseline conditions, and 
whether any effects were modulated by the IND-COL profiles of the participants. 
 
Experiment 1: Regression against IND-COL measures 
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 In this experiment, we measured the intrapersonal memory guidance effect based on the 
RT difference between valid and invalid trials in the own memory condition. Interpersonal 
memory guidance was measured as the RT difference between the different validity 
conditions for items falling in the other participant’s memory condition. The RT difference 
when nobody needed to memorise (baseline condition) was used to test the effect of mere 
presentation of preview images. We then recorded participants’ responses to an IND-COL 
questionnaire, and studied the relation between IND-COL scores and these effects. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 All volunteers were British Caucasians, participating as actor-confederate pairs. The 
actor group (seated on the right) consisted of 24 volunteers (21 females; 21 right-handed, 3 
left-handed) of 18-27 years of age (M = 19.9 years, SE = 0.4 years). The confederate group 
(seated on the left) were another 24 volunteers (18 females; all right-handed) with an age 
range of 18-23 years (M = 19.8 years, SE = 0.2 years). In any pair, both the actor and the 
confederate had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and had not met beforehand. The two 
participants in any pair were randomly assigned to the posts of actor and confederate. The 
two names were used to differentiate the two participants because one participant (the actor) 
took part in more tasks than the other (the confederate). 
 
Joint action setup 
 We adapted the standard WM and visual search paradigm (e.g., Soto et al., 2005) for the 
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purpose of testing two participants at the same time (He et al., 2011). The two participants 
(one actor and one confederate) in each pair sit side by side in front of a single monitor while 
performing their tasks independently. All participants took part in the WM task, whereas only 
the actors were engaged in the visual search task. Each participant’s tasks were first 
introduced by text on the screen and further explained by the experimenter when the other 
participant was also listening. This was to make sure that each participant knew his or her 
co-actor’s tasks in order to induce the interpersonal memory guidance effect. During the 
experiment, participants only focused on their assigned tasks (as they were not told to 
cooperate or compete) and were told to ignore their co-actors’ tasks. 
 
Materials and procedure 
 There were three image categories (40 images in each category) – one category (e.g., 
fruit) was designated for the memory task for the actor; a second category (e.g., musical 
instrument) was to be memorised by the confederate; the third category (e.g., animal) was 
irrelevant to either participant. This last category provided a baseline condition, to test if mere 
presentation of a stimulus in the initial display was sufficient to subsequently affect search. 
Picture category assignment to memory conditions was counterbalanced. 
 The experiment consisted of four 60-trial blocks. Each trial started with a 1,000-ms 
fixation cross, which was followed by a random image (2.1  2.1) from one of the three 
categories. This image remained at the screen centre for 500 ms and had to be kept in 
memory by the corresponding participant if it was from the actor’s or the confederate’s 
category. Both participants ignored this image if it was from the third category (the baseline 
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condition). After a 2,000-ms interval, a search display appeared for 1,000 ms or until the 
participant responded. Two pictures – the previewed image and another new picture that did 
not belong to any of the three primary categories (e.g., a watering can) – were presented 
randomly at two out of four positions (2.9 from fixation). Each picture was flanked by a pair 
of circles or squares (.6  .6). The circles were beside the previewed picture on 40% of the 
trials (valid condition, in which the previewed picture provides correct information about 
where the forthcoming circles would be), beside the other picture on 40% of the trials (invalid 
condition, in which the previewed picture provides wrong spatial information of the circles), 
and absent (squares appeared instead) on 20% of the trials (catch trials). The task was for the 
actor to make a speeded response to the presence of the circles by clicking the left mouse 
button no matter where the circles were (a simple RT task). No response was required on 
catch trials. If the previewed image was memorised by one of the participants, then on half of 
the trials, memory was tested after another 500-ms interval. Participants saw two pictures 
(3,000 ms or until response), which were exemplars from the same category as the preview 
on the trial, with one being exactly the same as the previewed image. The corresponding 
participant needed to indicate which picture matched the item in WM. To respond, the actors 
clicked the left and right mouse buttons, and the confederates pressed ‘c’ and ‘v’ on the 
keyboard, to the left and right images respectively. The next trial started after a 2,000-ms 
inter-trial interval (ITI) (Figure 1). 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 After the experiment, each participant completed an IND-COL questionnaire as 
introduced by Triandis (1995, pp. 206-207). The questionnaire consists of four subscales (HI, 
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VI, HC, and VC), each of which has eight items to be rated with a seven-point Likert-type 
scale (from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’). The actors’ scores of the four 
subscales were calculated and analysed along with their task performance. At the end of the 
experiment participants performed a surprise free memory recall task where they were asked 
to put down as many of the images as they could by naming, describing, or drawing. 
Participants carried out the questionnaire and the free memory recall tasks independently. 
 
Results 
IND-COL scores 
 We first analysed the IND-COL questionnaire’s attributes with all 48 participants’ data. 
The IND-COL scales showed acceptable to very good reliabilities: HI’s Cronbach α = .677, 
VI α = .831, HC α = .773, VC α = .766. Correlation analyses between the four subscale 
measures found no reliable correlation, ps > .11, except between HC and VC, r = .395, p 
= .0055. This agrees with Triandis (1995) in suggesting that HC and VC are correlated 
dimensions while VI is distinctively different from HI. We then used summed HC and VC 
scores to form a single Collectivism dimension. The reliability of items in this combined 
collectivism measurement was good, α = .814. 
 
Accuracies 
 Actors showed an accuracy of 96.4% in the immediate memory test, demonstrating their 
successful maintenance of WM. For the visual search task, participants had a mean false 
alarm rate of 8.0%. These data were not normally distributed as indicated by 
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D’Agostino-Pearson K2 tests, K2s > 7.59, ps < .023. Therefore the dataset was analysed with a 
three-sample Friedman test, which showed that differences between memory conditions were 
approaching but did not reach significance, χ2(2) = 5.34, p = .069. This was due to that 
participants had slightly more false alarms for images from their own memory category 
(12.0%) than those from the co-actor’s category (4.7%) and the baseline category (7.3%). 
This suggests that the participants could have had a marginally stronger tendency to respond 
to the visual search array when the initial image was from their own category, probably 
because this image category was most relevant to their tasks and therefore more likely to 
promote manual responses. The fact that the other’s memory condition had much lower false 
alarm rate than the own memory condition (and comparable to the baseline condition) 
suggests that the participants did not pay unnecessary attention to the co-actor’s image 
category. 
 All hit rate data distributions violated the normality assumption, K
2
s > 13.35, ps < .0013, 
except for valid trials in the baseline condition, K
2
 = 4.47, p = .11.Therefore we performed 
Wilcoxon tests contrasting valid and invalid conditions for the different memory conditions. 
There was a significant effect of validity for the own memory condition, Z = -2.36, p = .018, 
reflecting higher accuracy on valid (98.2%) than invalid trials (94.8%). This difference, 
however, was not reliable in the other’s memory condition, Z = -1.35, p = .18 (valid 96.4% vs. 
invalid 98.2%), or in the baseline condition, Z = -.46, p = .64 (96.1% vs. 95.1%). These 
results suggest that there was no speed-accuracy trade-off. As the accuracies were too high 
(100% in most cases) for meaningful analyses, these data were not analysed any further. 
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RTs 
 For each participant, RTs three standard deviations (SDs) away from the mean value 
were removed from any further analysis. This procedure was followed for all the current 
experiments. The RT means from all participants were put to a D’Agostino-Pearson K2 test 
for each condition and were confirmed as normal, K
2
s < 2.57, ps > .27. These data were then 
analysed with a 3 Memory (own, other, neither) × 2 Validity (valid, invalid) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). It showed a significant validity effect, F(1,23) = 18.38, p = .00027, η2 
= .44, and a reliable interaction between Validity and Memory, F(2,46) = 5.46, p = .0074, η2 
= .19. The main effect of memory did not approach significance, F(2,46) = .39, p = .68, η2 
= .02. The Validity × Memory interaction was then broken down by analysing the data 
separately for each memory condition. The validity effect was significant in the own memory 
condition, 497 ms vs. 539 ms, F(1,23) = 13.43, p = .0013, η2 = .37. This effect, however, was 
marginal for the other’s memory condition, 518 ms vs. 528 ms, F(1,23) = 3.33, p = .081, η2 
= .13, and clearly not reliable in the baseline condition, 518 ms vs. 526 ms, F(1,23) = 1.93, p 
= .18, η2 = .08. 
 We then implemented multiple regression analyses for RTs under the three memory 
conditions separately. Because only the actor in each participant pair responded in the visual 
search task, the IND-COL and RT data from the 24 actors were used. The dependent measure 
was the memory guidance effect defined as the RT difference between the valid and invalid 
conditions (invalid – valid). The HI, VI, and Collectivism scores were input as independent 
variables. For the other’s memory condition, we found a significant coefficient of 
collectivism, β = 1.31, t = 2.92, p = .0086 (Figure 2). There was no significant contribution 
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from HI or VI, ts < .76, ps > .45. And there were no significant coefficients of the own 
memory and baseline conditions, ts < 1.36, ps > .19 (Footnote 1). 
(Figure 2 about here) 
(Footnote 1 about here) 
 
Memory recall 
 A one-way ANOVA showed that actors had different recall performance across the 
memory conditions, F(2,46) = 33.06, p = 1.3 × 10
-9, η2 = .59. Recall was best for the 
participant’s own memory category (34.7%), and better for the other’s category (22.1%), 
compared with when the category of the initial stimulus was irrelevant to either participant 
(17.0%), all ps < .009. To show whether the relation between WM guidance and IND-COL 
scores received some contribution from long-term memory (LTM), we performed the same 
regression analyses for memory recall performance as for the attentional guidance effects. For 
all three regressions, none of the four predictors showed any significant contribution to recall, 
ts < 1.43, ps > .16. 
 
Discussion 
 The validity effect in the own-memory condition replicates prior findings of WM 
guidance on attention (Downing, 2000; Soto et al., 2005). In particular the absence of this 
effect in the baseline condition suggests that effects in the own memory conditions were due 
to top-down guidance of search based on the contents of WM over and above effects from 
bottom-up activation (from the mere presence of the stimuli). Furthermore, the data agree 
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with our previous finding that participants’ attention can be influenced by a representation of 
the stimuli that a confederate had in memory (He et al., 2011). The images memorised by the 
confederate, however, were not relevant to the actors’ tasks, suggesting that the guidance 
from WM is not due to participants deliberately attending to the memory item when it 
re-appears in the search display in order to refresh the WM for the following memory test 
(contrary to Woodman & Luck, 2007). 
 Furthermore, we found that the interpersonal WM effect on attention was reliably 
correlated with IND-COL scores: participants with higher collectivism scores showed 
stronger interpersonal WM guidance effects. This finding suggests that collectivism is related 
to the degree to which participants attended to the co-actor’s task. Moreover, this process is 
specific to the interpersonal WM guidance effect, because the collectivism-guidance 
correlation was absent for the intrapersonal guidance effect and the mere-presentation (when 
no memorisation was involved) effect (in the baseline condition). In contrast to the data 
relating to collectivism, there was no significant correlation between any RT effect and the 
individualism scores, suggesting that individualism does not play an important role in 
integrating processes within the co-actor’s task into the participant’s own task. 
 It is also crucial to note that the influence from IND-COL on RT effects was not echoed 
in the LTM recall test. The memory recall performance was consistently better for the 
confederate’s memory items relative to completely irrelevant items (in the baseline condition), 
and showed no correlation with the IND-COL scores. These data make it unlikely that the 
less collectivistic actors simply failed to attend to and encode the images in the confederates’ 
category, raising the possibility that collectivism does not contribute to LTM encoding and 
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longer-term retrieval. Instead, collectivism is more specifically involved in relation to 
whether a participant represents the content of the co-actor’s task in WM and guides attention 
as the participant performs his or her own task. 
 
Experiment 2: Priming IND-COL constructs 
 Experiment 1 correlated the memory guidance effects against the IND-COL scores, and 
found a reliable link between collectivism and the interpersonal memory guidance, 
suggesting that collectivism enhances interpersonal memory guidance of attention. However 
the data depend on regression analyses which do not directly demonstrate modulation by 
individualism and collectivism. To address these issues, Experiment 2 used an interventionist 
approach in which we primed participants with independent and interdependent constructs to 
actively facilitate access to individualistic and collectivistic themes respectively. We adapted 
the pronoun circling task, in which participants circle pronouns in a passage. This priming 
method has been proved successful in selectively activating the independent (individualistic) 
self when singular pronouns are detected and the interdependent (collectivistic) self when 
plural pronouns are detected, in both between-group (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner et al., 
1999) and within-group manipulations (Sui & Han, 2007; Sui, Hong, Liu, Humphreys, & Han, 
2013). If the effect from collectivism has a causal link to the interpersonal memory guidance 
effect, then we should expect to observe an enhancement of the interpersonal effect after 
collectivism priming in relative to the condition where no self-construal is primed. Because 
we hypothesised that individualism is not related to the interpersonal effect following 
Experiment 1, we should expect no such enhancement after individualism priming. In 
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addition, any change in the intrapersonal memory guidance effect after any of these priming 
manipulations would be unlikely. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 A group of forty naïve participants with normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight were 
tested as actor-confederate pairs. The actors were 20 British Caucasian volunteers (15 
females; 17 right-handed, 3 left-handed) between 18-28 years of age (M = 21.2 years, SE = 
0.5 years). The confederate group were 20 Caucasian volunteers (15 females; 16 right-handed, 
2 left-handed, 2 ambidextrous) with an age range of 19-31 years (M = 21.8 years, SE = 0.8 
years). The actor and confederate in any pair were strangers before the experiment took place. 
 
Materials and procedure 
 As in Experiment 1, the actors performed both WM and visual search tasks, whereas the 
confederates only took part in the WM task. Because we were only interested in whether the 
intra- and inter-personal memory guidance effect are affected by manipulating IND-COL, and 
in order to reduce the duration of the experiment, we removed the baseline memory condition 
(in which the images were irrelevant to both participants). Furthermore, three priming 
conditions were introduced: interdependent self-construal (collectivism), independent 
self-construal (individualism), and neutral priming. 
 The experiment consisted six 50-trial blocks; two consecutive blocks for each priming 
condition. In each block, two image categories were assigned to the two participants, so that 
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for each participant there was an own category and a co-actor’s category. We used different 
image categories (36 images per category) across the priming conditions, making it possible 
to differentiate LTM memory performance (which was tested at the end of the experiment by 
a surprise free memory recall task) associated with images used for different priming 
conditions. The sequence of priming conditions and the assignment of categories for the two 
participants were counterbalanced across pairs. The trial procedure was the same as that in 
Experiment 1, except that the duration of the initial fixation cross was reduced from 1,000 ms 
to 500 ms, and that the ITI was changed from 2,000 ms to 1,500 ms (to further reduce the 
duration of the experiment). 
 Priming was realised with a pronoun circling task (Sui & Han, 2007; Sui et al., 2013). 
The participants were primed immediately before each block, so that priming was applied 
twice for each priming condition (as there were two blocks per condition) to maximise the 
priming effect. The priming manipulation was realised within-group to enhance statistical 
power given that the number of participants was limited due to the experiment’s length. 
Participants were asked to read a short story, then circle certain words and check it before 
proceeding with the computer program. In the neutral priming condition, the story contained 
no interdependent or independent pronouns, and participants circled two nouns. In the other 
two priming conditions, participants were to circle pronouns in the stories, in which 
first-person singular pronouns (e.g., ‘I’, ‘my’) were used in the independent (individualism) 
priming condition, while first-person plural pronouns (e.g., ‘we’, ‘our’) were used in the 
interdependent (collectivism) priming condition. The story content and order were 
counterbalanced across pairs. This will remove any possible carry-over effect between 
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different priming manipulations. 
 
Results 
Accuracies 
 For accuracies, most data did not fit into normal distributions as revealed by 
D’Agostino-Pearson K2 tests, therefore the data were analysed with non-parametric tests. In 
the immediate memory test, a Friedman test showed that actors’ performance did not differ 
across the priming conditions, χ2(2) = 1.47, p = .48. The high overall accuracy (98.1%) 
suggested that the actors had no difficulties maintaining the images in WM. 
 For the visual search task, false alarms were analysed with two Friedman tests for the 
own and other memory conditions respectively. In the own memory condition, the false alarm 
rates had a mean value of 10.7%, and did not differ across priming conditions, χ2(2) = 4.62, p 
= .099. Performance was slightly better in the other’s memory condition (8.0%), and did not 
vary across priming conditions either, χ2(2) = .12, p = .94. We then analysed the hit rate data 
with six Wilcoxon tests contrasting valid and invalid search conditions with varying priming 
and memory conditions. The hit rates were approaching ceiling (98.9% in average), and 
showed no significant difference for any test, Zs > -1.67, ps > .095. The accuracy data were 
not further analysed. 
 
RTs 
 For each participant, RTs were trimmed with a three-SDs threshold. To statistically assess 
whether the collectivism/individualism priming treatment had different effects on intra- and 
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inter-personal memory guidance, in comparison with the neutral priming baseline, we 
planned four two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs. These ANOVAs contrasted the validity 
effect in the collectivism or individualism priming condition against the neutral priming 
baseline in the different memory conditions separately. 
 First, we contrasted the collectivism priming against the neutral priming. We carried out 
two separate ANOVAs for the two memory conditions (own and other’s). Each ANOVA had a 
2 Priming (collectivism vs. neutral) × 2 Validity (valid vs. invalid) design. These data are 
summarised in Figure 3. For the intrapersonal memory guidance effects (own memory), the 
ANOVA revealed a significant validity effect, F(1,19) = 32.53, p = 1.7 × 10
-5, η2 = .63, 
showing a much shorter RT in the valid than in the invalid conditions, 455 ms vs. 490 ms. 
The main effect of Priming or interaction did not approach significance, Fs < 1.58, ps > .22, 
η2s < .077. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 The analyses for the interpersonal guidance effects (in the other’s memory condition) 
revealed a different pattern. As before, we found a significant validity effect (valid 464 ms vs. 
invalid 479 ms), F(1,19) = 14.03, p = .0014, η2 = .43. More importantly, there was a 
significant Priming × Validity interaction, F(1,19) = 5.42, p = .031, η2 = .22, indicating that 
the validity effect was stronger when participants were primed with the collectivism 
treatment (collectivism priming: 461 ms vs. 486 ms; neutral priming: 468 ms vs. 472 ms). 
This priming effect, however, did not affect the overall RTs, evidenced in the lack of a main 
effect of Priming, F(1,19) = .19, p = .67, η2 = .010. The D’Agostino-Pearson K2 tests before 
the ANOVAs confirmed that the data were normally distributed, K
2
s < 3.97, ps > .13. 
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 We then compared the individualism priming data with the neutral priming data with two 
similar ANOVAs. The results are demonstrated in Figure 4. For the intrapersonal effects, the 
only significant result came from the validity effect (valid 450 ms vs. invalid 485 ms), F(1,19) 
= 19.96, p = .00026, η2 = .51. Other effects were not significant, Fs < .011, ps > .92, η2s 
< .00055. The use of ANOVA was validated as the data for each variable fit into a normal 
distribution, K
2
s < 5.52, ps > .063. The ANOVA for the interpersonal effects found no 
significant result at all, Fs < 2.70, ps > .11, η2s < .13. However, the data from one variable 
(the valid condition of other’s category under individualism priming) were not normally 
distributed, K
2
 = 20.85, p = 3.0 × 10
-5
, due to that one participant had a much slower response 
than others. After removing this single participant, a normal distribution was confirmed in all 
variables, K
2
s < .93, ps > .62. We then re-ran the ANOVA and found similar results: all effects 
were insignificant, Fs < 3.08, ps > .096, η2s < .15. These results suggest that the 
individualism priming did not have an effect on interpersonal memory guidance (Footnote 2). 
(Figure 4 about here) 
(Footnote 2 about here) 
 
Memory recall 
 Memory recall performance was analysed with two separate 2 Priming (collectivism vs. 
neutral, or individualism vs. neutral) × 2 Memory (own vs. other’s) ANOVAs. In the ANOVA 
contrasting the collectivism against neutral priming, we only found that recall was better for 
the participant’s own category than the co-actor’s, 32.0% vs. 21.5%, F(1,19) = 33.17, p = 1.5 
× 10
-5, η2 = .64. A similar result was obtained from the ANOVA analysing the individualism 
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and neutral priming conditions, 33.2% vs. 20.6%, F(1,19) = 28.98, p = 3.4 × 10
-5, η2 = .60. 
Main effects of Priming and its interaction with Memory did not approach significance in 
either ANOVA, Fs < 1.31, ps > .26, η2s < .065. 
 
Discussion 
 When the participants were primed with collectivism (an interdependent construal), the 
interpersonal memory guidance effect was significantly enhanced compared with the neutral 
priming condition. In contrast, priming individualism (an independent construal) showed a 
similar result to that in the neutral priming condition, and non-reliable effects of interpersonal 
attentional guidance were found. The data support the results in Experiment 1, suggesting 
that collectivism is a key factor in the process of interpersonal memory guidance, whereas 
individualism is not. 
 Compared with the regression approach taken in Experiment 1, the priming manipulation 
in Experiment 2 is more direct and indicates a causal relationship with the outcome, giving us 
more confidence in suggesting that collectivism is one of the key factors driving the 
interpersonal attentional guidance effect. This guidance process needs two sequential 
components, namely the encoding of items from the co-actor’s task in WM, and secondly the 
application of this representation to guide attention deployment. Given that there was no 
evidence that collectivism priming enhanced LTM for items from the co-actor’s category, it 
can be argued that memory coding itself is not the source of the collectivism effect, but rather 
that collectivism modulates whether attention is oriented to the re-appearance of the stimulus 
relevant to the co-actor, after the stage of memory coding (see He et al., 2011). For example, 
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in individuals low in collectivism, there may be some executive control exerted which 
militates against attentional deployment to stimuli related to the co-actor (Han & Kim, 2009). 
A further possibility is that individuals low in collectivism do not hold the co-actor’s stimulus 
at the forefront of WM, though the mere encoding into WM is sufficient to modulate LTM 
performance (see Olivers, 2009, for arguments about holding items at the forefront of WM). 
 Regarding individualism, similar to Experiment 1, the data showed no evidence of any 
effect. This confirms that the absence of any individualism effect in Experiment 1 was not 
due to lack of measurement power. 
 
Experiment 3: Emphasising competition 
 Experiment 2 manipulated IND-COL by priming participants with 
independent/interdependent self construal. However, as we discussed in the Introduction, 
unlike HC and VC which are highly correlated and can be combined as a single measure, HI 
and VI are distinct measures. In contrast to the generally accepted traits of individualism such 
as ‘independent, unique, and having more interest in the self than the collective’, VI 
emphasises competition and winning (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995). Our priming 
study addressed collectivism (the combination of HC and VC) and HI, but may not have 
succeeded in manipulating VI. 
 In Experiment 3, we investigated the effect of VI by introducing a competition session, 
which was contrasted against a standard session. In the competition session, each participant 
was asked to compete with the co-actor. In the standard session, participants performed the 
tasks in a similar manner to individuals in Experiments 1 and 2. Any difference in behaviour 
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patterns across the two sessions will show the effect of competition. In addition to this, we 
also correlated participants’ performance against their scores on competition-related scales. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Seventeen pairs of British Caucasian participants (23 females; 29 right-handed, 5 
left-handed) with normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight took part. The two persons in any 
pair did not know each other, and none had participated in either of the first two experiments. 
They had an age range of 18-23 years (M = 19.5 years, SE = 0.2 years). 
 
Materials and procedure 
 The experiment consisted of a standard session and a competition session. In the 
competition session, an extra £10 bonus was to be split by the two participants according to 
their performance (a score that balanced RTs and accuracy). This incentive was introduced to 
encourage participants to compete with the co-actor. In the standard session, there was no 
mention of any extra information. 
 The two sessions took place at least three days apart (M = 6.8 days, SE = 1.1 days) to 
reduce any carry-over effect regarding competitiveness. In each session, three image 
categories (36 images in each category) were used, to produce three memory conditions for 
each participant: own memory, other’s memory, and baseline (no WM). Different image 
categories were used for the two sessions. The sequence of the two sessions and the material 
usage were counterbalanced across pairs of participants. 
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 Each experiment session consisted of six 60-trial blocks. The trial procedure slightly 
differed from that of Experiment 1. In order to introduce a competitive aspect to performance, 
we had both participants engage in visual search. To keep the experiment as close as possible 
to Experiments 1 and 2, we only asked one participant to respond in any single trial. To 
achieve this, a 500-ms cue (‘X’) was presented to one side of the screen simultaneously with 
the onset of the initial fixation cross, to indicate who was going to respond in this trial. In the 
immediate memory test at the end of each own-memory trial, only one image was shown. 
The corresponding participant made a choice response to report whether this image matched 
the memorised image in the trial (‘Yes’ or ’No’) by clicking the left or right mouse button (for 
participants on the right) or by pressing ‘c’ or ‘v’ on the keyboard (for participants on the left). 
All other aspects remained the same as in Experiment 1. 
 After being introduced to the bonus scheme for the competition session, participants 
were asked to rate how strongly they felt that they were competitive in relation to their 
co-actor by using a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’; the 
competitive feeling question). After completing the tasks on the computer, participants 
completed a competitiveness questionnaire, which aimed at measuring how competitive the 
participants were and whether the participants were actively engaged in the competition 
during the experiment. This questionnaire was a combination of three parts: a) Revised 
Competitiveness Index (RCI: 14 items; Houston et al., 2002), b) the competitiveness subscale 
of the Work and Family Orientation Scale (WOFO: 5 items; Helmreich & Spence, 1978; see 
Gill, 1986), and c) an additional item ‘I have done my best to compete against my co-actor 
during the experiment’ (the competitive effort question). They needed to indicate to what 
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extent they agreed with these statements using a five-point Likert scale. A free memory recall 
test was carried out by the end of each session. 
 
Results 
Questionnaire scores 
 Before the experiment, participants’ responses to the statement ‘I feel competitive in 
relation to my testing co-actor’ averaged 3.25, not significantly higher than the central point, 
t(33) = .14, p = .17. However, being halfway between totally uncompetitive and totally 
competitive, this central point was more or less an arbitrary midpoint. The point of lacking 
any competitiveness on this scale was 1, where participants did not feel competitive at all. 
And this point was found significantly below the participants’ feeling, t(33) = 13.21, p = 9.9 
× 10
-15
. After the experiment, participants’ rating on how much effort they had made in the 
competition was significantly higher than both the central point, M = 3.97, t(33) = 6.26, p = 
4.5 × 10
-7
, and the uncompetitive end of the scale, , t(33) = 19.16, p = 1.9 × 10
-19
. These data 
suggest that participants were actively engaged in competing against the co-actor. 
 For the questionnaires, one participant did not give an answer to one question in RCI, 
and was deleted when RCI scores were needed in any analysis. The RCI data showed very 
good reliability, α = .855. Data from the WOFO were also very reliable, α = .797. The RCI 
and WOFO scores were highly correlated, r = .780, p = 8.8 × 10
-8
, suggesting that the two 
questionnaires have similar abilities in measuring competitiveness. We then correlated the 
RCI/WOFO scores with the competitive feeling/effort responses. The WOFO showed a 
strong correlation with each question, r = .504, p = .0024 (the feeling), and r = .444, p 
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= .0085 (the effort). The correlation between the RCI scores and the ‘competitive feeling’ 
responses reached significance as well, r = .383, p = .023. The correlation between RCI and 
the competitive effort was weaker and only approached significance, r = .339, p = .054. As 
revealed by a direct correlation analysis, the competitive feeling was significantly predictive 
of competitive effort, r = .416, p = .014. 
 
Accuracies 
 As the accuracy data generally were not normally distributed, we analysed these data 
using Wilcoxon tests. For the immediate memory task, participants performed well (96.5% 
accurate), and there was no significant difference between the two sessions, Z = -.98, p = .33. 
For visual search, false alarm rates were comparable to those in previous experiments (M = 
9.7%), and did not differ across sessions for any of the three memory conditions, Zs > -.76, 
ps > .44. Hit rates were analysed with six separate tests for different memory conditions and 
sessions. Overall accuracy was high (97.7%), and no significant difference was found, Zs > 
-1.04, ps > .29, apart from a small but significant validity effect in the baseline condition 
during the competition session, Z = -.249, p = .013 (valid 97.9% vs. invalid 96.1%). As the 
performance was approaching ceiling, these data were not analysed further. 
 
RTs 
 All RT data in the visual search task had normal distributions, K
2
s < 3.16, ps > .20. Then, 
similar to the analyses in Experiment 2, we analysed the RT dataset with three two-way 
ANOVAs, whose factors were Competition (competitive vs. standard) and Validity (valid vs. 
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invalid). These ANOVAs tested the effect of the competition treatment on the validity effects 
in different memory conditions separately. The ANOVA for the own memory condition found 
a significant of competition, F(1,33) = 8.95, p = .0052, η2 = .21, showing that participants 
were faster in the competitive session (430 ms vs. 465 ms). A significant validity effect was 
observed as well, F(1,33) = 29.30, p = 5.4 × 10
-6, η2 = .47 (valid 437 ms vs. invalid 457 ms). 
The two factors did not interact, F(1,33) = .44, p = .51, η2 = .013. 
 The ANOVA for the interpersonal memory guidance yielded similar results, with a 
significant competition effect, F(1,33) = 9.09, p = .0049, η2 = .22 (competition 426 ms vs. 
standard 460 ms), and a significant validity effect, F(1,33) = 4.77, p = .036, η2 = .13 (valid 
439 ms vs. invalid 447 ms). The interaction was not significant, F(1,33) = .067, p = .80, η2 
= .0020. 
 For the baseline condition, where no WM was involved, the competition effect was 
significant as well, F(1,33) = 8.99, p = .0051, η2 = .21 (competition 429 ms vs. standard 462 
ms). Different from Experiment 1 though, the validity effect also reached significance, F(1,33) 
= 7.37, p = .010, η2 = .18 (valid 440 ms vs. invalid 451 ms). No significant interaction was 
found, F(1,33) = .69, p = .41, η2 = .020 (Footnote 3). 
(Footnote 3 about here) 
 We then looked into whether the competition questionnaire scores were predictive of the 
intra- and inter-personal memory guidance effects and the baseline validity effect by putting 
the validity effects (measured as RT differences between the invalid and valid conditions) in 
the competition session into separate correlation analyses against the four questionnaire 
scores (RCI, WOFO, competitive feeling, competitive effort). There was a highly significant 
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correlation between the competitive effort and the intrapersonal validity effect, r = .527, p 
= .0014 (Figure 5). All other correlations, however, were not significant, ps > .16 (Footnote 
4). 
(Figure 5 about here) 
(Footnote 4 about here) 
 
Memory recall 
 Memory recall data were analysed with a two-way ANOVA: 2 Competition (competition 
vs. standard) × 3 Memory (own, other’s, baseline). There was a significant main effect of 
Memory, F(1,33) = 29.57, p = 6.8 × 10
-10, η2 = .47. Pairwise comparisons showed that recall 
was better for the participant’s own category (34.5%) than for the co-actor’s category (23.0%) 
and the baseline category (19.7%), ps < 1.1 × 10
-5
. The recall performance also differed for 
the co-actor’s and the baseline categories, p = .045. Performance in the competition session 
(27.0%) was slightly better than in the standard session (24.5%). However this difference was 
not significant, F(1,33) = 2.48, p = .12, η2 = .070. The interaction did not approach 
significance either, F(2,66) = .15, p = .86, η2 = .0047. We then correlated these six recall rates 
separately against the four questionnaire scores. The absence of any significant result 
(ps > .095) suggests that the scores were not predictive of LTM recall performance. 
 
Discussion 
 We tested the effect of VI using a competition manipulation. The manipulation was 
successful, as participants reported feeling competitive and having made efforts to compete 
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against their co-actors. Also, competition rendered the overall RTs significantly shorter. Data 
showed that the competitive effort was predictive of the intrapersonal WM guidance effect. 
This can be explained either by the tendency of participants to voluntarily use the memorised 
contents to guide attention even they were not relevant to the visual search task, or by 
participants implicitly holding the memorised images more at the forefront of WM (see 
Olivers, 2009), as a result of intensive engagement with their tasks in competition. Despite 
the significant contribution of competition effort, the competitiveness scores, however, did 
not correlate with the intrapersonal WM guidance. This seems to suggest that intrapersonal 
WM guidance is more related to the competition behaviour; the mere tendency for 
competition is not a factor strong enough to predict the WM guidance. 
 More importantly, we did not find any effect of competitiveness (the main theme of VI) 
or competitive effort on the interpersonal WM guidance. This suggests that neither 
competitiveness nor interpersonal competition itself influences memory guidance of attention 
interpersonally (guidance by co-representation of co-actor’s WM), despite that competition 
affects attentional guidance by one’s own WM. These data agree with the results we obtained 
in Experiment 1 by showing no effect of VI on the interpersonal memory effect, yet disagree 
with previous findings that competition affects joint action performance, either negatively 
(Hommel et al., 2009; Iani et al., 2011) or positively (Ruys & Aarts, 2010). The discrepancy 
of joint action performance between a variety of tasks hints that different cognitive functions 
may receive social influence in different manners. The interpersonal WM guidance effect, 
according to the data we gathered so far, is not affected by competition, implying that VI and 
interpersonal memory guidance are distinct processes which have little overlap. Moreover, as 
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our previous study (He et al., 2011) and Experiment 1 in the present paper demonstrated, the 
interpersonal memory guidance is generally not a voluntary process as the representation of 
the co-actor’s task is irrelevant to the participant’s primary tasks. Unlike the intrapersonal 
effect, the interpersonal guidance does not receive influence from voluntary competitive 
engagement. 
 
General Discussion 
 In the present study, we replicated our previous findings of intrapersonal (own WM) and 
interpersonal (other’s WM) memory guidance effects. In relation to the intrapersonal memory 
guidance effect, we replicated results from other studies that attention is drawn to stimuli that 
are concurrently held in WM, even when the contents of WM are not relevant to the search 
task (Soto et al., 2005). For the interpersonal guidance effect, the results additionally counter 
the argument that guidance reflects participants trying to ‘top-up’ their memory for the 
following memory task (see Woodman & Luck, 2007, for this argument), since the participant 
never underwent a WM test for items from their co-actor’s category. To account for both the 
intrapersonal and the interpersonal memory effects, we suggest that participants hold cues in 
memory, both when the cues belong to their ‘memorise’ category and when they belong to the 
confederate’s category. Once held in memory, the cue is matched against the upcoming search 
display. A match between a search item and the WM representation provides an input to the 
selection process, along with a match between a display item and the actual search target. 
When the cue and the target both direct attention to the same location (on valid trials) 
performance is speeded relative to when the cue and the target at different locations (on 
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invalid trials) compete for selection. 
 More importantly the present study demonstrates additional, social influences on 
cognition. Most notably the results show that interpersonal memory guidance is affected by 
collectivism, which is a measure of interdependency between individuals and their 
association with their collective group. The stronger the collectivistic tendency, the larger the 
interpersonal guidance effect. This was demonstrated by a significant correlation between 
collectivism scores and the magnitude of the interpersonal guidance effect, and by the 
increased interpersonal guidance effect after participants being primed by an interdependent 
self construal. This last result further indicates that, just as the IND-COL is a dynamic social 
attribute, so the interpersonal memory guidance effect also varies across different social 
scenarios: the same individual is likely to show a stronger interpersonal memory effect when 
the interdependent construal is primed in contrast to the neutral priming condition 
(Experiment 2). When the independent construal is primed, however, the interpersonal 
memory effect does not seem to differ in size from that in the neutral priming condition. 
 The most intriguing question is how to better understand the enhancing effect of 
collectivism on interpersonal WM guidance. It is likely that individuals who are more 
collectivistic by their default self construal status (as measured by the IND-COL 
questionnaire), or when their collectivistic themes are selectively activated, are more likely to 
conceive that both actors in a pair are working together towards a common goal. This echoes 
the suggestion that shared experiences (e.g., tasks and goals) and identity similarity are 
crucial in the formation of interpersonal co-representation (e.g., Richardson et al., 2012; 
Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013; Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011; see also Schilbach et al., 
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2013). It is worth noting that the common goal in the current experimental setup is not made 
explicit to the participants as in other studies, but is rather embodied implicitly (as a general 
tendency) in the collectivistic self construal. The first implication of this proposal is that 
shared goals do not have to be made explicit before it can achieve influences on interpersonal 
interaction. Secondly, this also leads to a possible suggestion that the collectivism scale may 
be more capable of showing subtle effects of mutually shared conceptions than the seemingly 
more discrete manipulation of goal sharing. Whether this conjecture is correct or not, our 
results indicate that, when collectivism is emphasised, participants pay more attention to their 
co-actor’s task and allow stimuli from that task to not only enter WM but also to guide their 
own attention. These findings extend our understanding of interpersonal processing by 
showing that self-construed interdependency is an important driving force of the 
interpersonal memory guidance effect. 
 Moreover, it is essential to discriminate the memory guidance effect (i.e. the application 
of WM contents in the process of guiding visual attention in space) from LTM encoding, 
tested here by a surprise recall task. For LTM recall there was no relation to collectivism and 
no difference across the social conditions (e.g., in Experiment 2). The results suggest that the 
effects of collectivism here modulate on-line memory-based attentional guidance, but do not 
alter the extent to which items enter LTM – though for all participants there was better recall 
of the other’s items than items from the neutral category (irrelevant to both participants). This 
differs from studies which showed improved memory and learning when task sharing was 
elevated (Richardson et al., 2012; Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013). One account of this is 
that all participants encode their co-actor’s as well as their own memory items in WM, but 
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only those high in collectivism hold their co-actor’s item at the forefront of WM (see Olivers, 
2009), promoting another form of memory advantage by allowing it to guide attention. 
However, the encoding through WM is nevertheless sufficient for subsequent LTM recall. 
 The current study provided some insights into the interaction between collectivism and 
interpersonal processes. However, it is important to remain cautious about directly linking 
these findings to studies investigating group membership (e.g., Miles, Lumsden, Richardson, 
& Macrae, 2011; Shteynberg, 2010). It is true that collectivistic individuals have close links 
with ingroup members whereas individualistic persons keep the links loose. However, it is 
more difficult for collectivists to take a person as an ingroup member, and they have fewer 
ingroups (Triandis, 1995). And collectivists’ ingroups are fundamentally different from 
minimal groups (see Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) imposed by applying an 
arbitrary criterion in many studies (e.g., Iani et al., 2011, Experiment 1; Miles et al., 2011). 
As a result, a direct comparison is not easy, and awaits further studies. 
 In contrast to collectivism, HI failed to affect the interpersonal memory guidance. This 
suggests that HI participants may emphasise personal interests and process information 
analytically, but this has little to do with how they perceive relations between co-actors and 
use global context (e.g., Brewer & Chen, 2007; Norenzayan et al., 2007). Furthermore, we 
failed to find any contribution from VI, not only with the manipulation of competition, but 
also by showing the absence of any correlation between the interpersonal WM guidance 
effect and the VI (Experiment 1) and competitiveness (Experiment 3) scores. These data 
convergingly suggest that, unlike some other joint action tasks (Hommel et al., 2009; Iani et 
al., 2011; Ruys & Aarts, 2010), the interpersonal WM guidance is not susceptible to the VI 
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dimension of self construal. 
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Figure 1. Example of a trial in Experiment 1. Two participants were sitting in front of a 
single monitor performing working memory (WM) and visual search tasks. The preview 
image was kept in memory by the corresponding participant (either the actor or the 
confederate, if the preview was from his/her category), who performed the WM test on half of 
the to-be-memorised trials. The actor carried out a visual search task by making speeded 
responses to circles (simple reaction time task) while the preview was held in his/her own 
memory, in the confederate’s memory, or in neither’s memory (baseline condition). 
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Figure 2. Correlation between collectivism scores and interpersonal memory guidance 
effects in RTs (Experiment 1). 
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Figure 3. Validity effects under collectivism and neutral priming in (A) the own and (B) 
other’s memory conditions, in the latter of which the effect size differs (Experiment 2). 
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Figure 4. Validity effects under individualism and neutral priming in (A) the own and (B) 
other’s memory conditions. No differential priming effect is observed (Experiment 2).  
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Figure 5. Correlation between competitive effort scores and intrapersonal memory guidance 
effects in RTs (Experiment 3). 
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Footnote 1. To provide some preliminary data, we also checked the gender difference in the 
RT dataset despite that it was not our aim and that we did not balance sample sizes of the two 
gender groups. Experiment 1 only had three males, making any analysis with the male group 
meaningless. The regression results from the female participants showed the same pattern – 
only a significant correlation between the interpersonal memory guidance effect and the 
collectivism score was found, β = 1.35, t = 2.99, p = .0082. 
Footnote 2. We investigated the gender difference in two ways. First we carried out four 
three-way ANOVAs (for different memory conditions and priming contrasts) with an 
additional gender factor (Gender × Priming × Validity) to see whether there was any 
interaction involving gender. Results failed to find any of these, all ps > .12. Then we 
checked the two-way ANOVAs for female and male groups separately. Similar patterns were 
found for the two gender groups. For the female group, the collectivism priming produced 
marginally stronger interpersonal memory guidance than the neutral priming, F(1,14) = 4.19, 
p = .060, η2 = .23. This effect had the same pattern but had a much lower significance level in 
the much smaller male group, F(1,4) = 1.24, p = .33, η2 = .24. All other effects in these 
ANOVAs were far from significant, ps > .44. 
Footnote 3. The effect of gender was also checked in the same way as in Experiment 2. The 
three-way ANOVAs (Gender × Competition × Validity, for the three memory conditions 
separately) revealed shorter RTs in the competition session, all ps < .016. Males were also 
faster than females, Fs > 6.99, ps < .013. These analyses, however, did not show any 
influence from gender on any of the validity effects, all ps > .46. We then looked at the 
pattern for the male and female groups separately. Again, in all six two-way ANOVAs, the RT 
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patterns were similar between the male and the female groups. Apart from the overall 
speed-up of RTs in the competition session, no other influence from competition was 
observed, all ps > .39. So far, the female and male groups showed similar behaviour patterns. 
Footnote 4. Correlation analyses between validity effects and competition questionnaire 
scores were carried out for the two gender groups separately. The results from the female 
group echoed the main analysis – only a significant correlation between the competitive effort 
and the intrapersonal memory guidance was found, r = .51, p = .013. The correlation between 
the competitive feeling and the interpersonal memory guidance was approaching but slightly 
short of significance, r = .40, p = .055. We also found a marginally significant negative 
correlation between the competitive feeling and the validity effect in the baseline condition, r 
= -.39, p = .069. No other correlation was significant, ps > .1. The male group, with a smaller 
sample size, had a marginal correlation between the competitive effort and the intrapersonal 
effect, r = .58, p = .061, echoing the results from the female group. Different from the females, 
the males showed significant correlations between three competition scores (competitive 
effort, RCI, and WOFO) and the validity effect in the baseline condition, r = .68 ~ .89, ps 
< .023. All other effects were far from significance, ps > .24. The differential patterns 
between males and females might reflect different strategies in competition. 
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Highlights 
* Visual attention can be guided by memory contents maintained by a co-actor. 
* The contribution of individualism-collectivism to this effect is examined. 
* The effect positively correlates with collectivism, but not individualism, scores. 
* The effect is enhanced by collectivistic, but not individualistic, priming. 
* Competitiveness, a measure of vertical individualism, does not contribute either. 
